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Nvidia faces scrutiny over what its security team knew

16.11.2026 10:03 • Author: IT-PUB

Nvidia faces scrutiny over what its security team knew

After Nvidia’s security chief left in August, reports about Jensen Huang and Megaspeed raised questions over who knew what inside the company.

Nvidia is facing scrutiny over a different kind of risk than chipmaking or export controls: what its security team may have known about sensitive relationships around CEO Jensen Huang and a federal inquiry involving Megaspeed. The issue emerged after the company’s longtime chief security officer stepped down in August, followed weeks later by reports about Huang’s personal relationships and ties to an executive at a company under U.S. investigation. That overlap has raised questions about where security, HR, legal and the board each draw the line.

There is no indication in the source that Nvidia’s security team was directly involved in either matter. But the episode points to a broader concern. At a company as strategically important as Nvidia, could warning signs have reached the right people — and if they did, were they acted on?

A security chief left, then attention shifted

David Reber, who spent four years as Nvidia’s chief security officer and seven years at the company overall, stepped down in August. At the time, he said he was leaving for health reasons and later disclosed on LinkedIn that he had been diagnosed with young-onset Parkinson’s more than two years earlier.

His replacement is Saša Zdjelar, who previously spent 17 years at ExxonMobil in Houston, leaving as a senior IT manager before moving to Salesforce for a year and later to the cybersecurity company ReversingLabs. Zdjelar did not respond to questions about the transition or about what the security team knew.

The timing has drawn attention, though nothing public ties the leadership change in security to the Megaspeed matter or to the later reports about Huang’s relationships. Nvidia has not answered related questions either, as IT-PUB News notes.

Megaspeed and the board-level risk

The first thread involves Megaspeed, a Singapore data center company that U.S. investigators suspect of funneling Nvidia chips to China. The New York Times reported earlier this week that Nvidia’s top lawyer was already engaged with the government’s Megaspeed inquiry more than a year ago. Nvidia has said it regularly contacts officials.

The second thread concerns reports that Huang had relationships with employees, including one with an executive at Megaspeed and, according to later reporting, a second relationship with a different Nvidia employee. The Times cited five Nvidia employees who said he was involved with a vice president who reported directly to him. Reuters later reported a second relationship, citing two people.

The source notes that relationships between a CEO and employees would usually fall to HR, legal and the board rather than security. The Megaspeed connection makes the picture more complicated, though, because it is not just an internal workplace matter. It involves a company under federal investigation, making the personal and business sides harder to separate.

Megaspeed has denied wrongdoing.

Why security teams may still matter

Security specialists quoted in the source say that even if a relationship is not itself a security incident, it can become one if it creates leverage. A foreign intelligence service, they argue, could use a secret affair to pressure an executive into staying quiet or sharing information.

That risk goes beyond office romances. Suspicious business relationships, conflicts of interest and attempts to obtain sensitive information through trusted personal contacts can all become security issues, even if they do not resemble a classic cyberattack.

Nicholas Eftimiades, a retired senior intelligence officer who has trained more than 1,000 corporate security professionals, said intelligence collection often happens through ordinary conversation rather than hacking. That can make early warning signs much harder for corporate security teams to spot.

So the danger is not always a technical breach. It can be a chain of personal contacts, pressure points and small disclosures that build over time.

What intelligence services look for inside companies

The source suggests that foreign intelligence services are often after more than technology itself. They may want policy insight — who is pushing for export-rule changes, who is blocking them, and where the pressure points are inside a company or government.

Eftimiades gave a hypothetical example in which a CEO complains that he cannot move forward because the board is resisting. To an intelligence service, that can identify the obstacle and point to the next target. From there, the focus may shift to email, phones or other access routes.

He also said the playbook is not new, especially in relation to China, and that executives dealing with the country often say they have been approached. He described the newer version of this activity as longer-term and more patient than Soviet-era spying, with relationships that may last years rather than weeks.

The source does not say any of this happened in Huang’s case. It does explain, though, why the episode has prompted questions that go beyond ordinary corporate gossip.

Corporate security may not have unlimited reach

Even if Nvidia’s security team had heard about the relevant relationships or the Megaspeed scrutiny, specialists say it may not have had unlimited tools to respond.

Eftimiades said security teams are often underfunded because they do not directly generate revenue. He said it is common for CEOs to respond to security warnings with little more than a compliance-level budget.

Others argue that many companies define security too narrowly, focusing on facilities, cyberattacks and physical threats while paying less attention to insider risk. In an opinion piece in The Hill, Don Aviv, CEO of the corporate investigations firm Interfor International, and author Jeremy Hurewitz wrote that security teams should pay more attention to executive cultivation by foreign intelligence services, suspicious business relationships and attempts to get sensitive information through trusted personal contacts.

The source says Nvidia’s scale and business relationships would make it surprising if its security function were not broader than average. But that is not guaranteed.

There are also limits to what any internal team can catch. Eftimiades said a security team may be able to notice a warning sign, but not always act on it before the damage is done. He also noted that a rival intelligence service often does not need a technical exploit if it can identify the person blocking a policy or business goal.

That is why the questions around Nvidia are not only about personal conduct or company policy. They also touch on whether corporate security is being asked to manage threats that are partly human, partly political and often hidden in plain sight.

For now, one basic question remains unanswered: what did Nvidia’s security team know, and when did it know it? The board’s independent investigation and federal inquiries may eventually clarify that. Until then, the episode underscores how security concerns in the tech industry can extend well beyond servers and software.


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